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The Ingenious Kerry Tax Plan
By Reuven S. Avi-Yonah
The tax plan proposed by Democratic presidential
candidate John Kerry at Wayne State University on
March 26 is an ingenious set of ideas to encourage
domestic job creation. Its greatest strength, however,
may be its contribution to long-term economic growth,
fairness, and tax law simplification. In this article I will
first describe the Kerry proposal, then analyze its ad-
vantages, and finally address some counterarguments.
I. The Kerry Proposal
Under current law, American multinationals have
an incentive to invest in overseas operations because
active business income earned by their foreign sub-
sidiaries is generally exempt from current U.S. tax.1
Moreover, once the overseas investment is made, the
multinationals have an added incentive to keep their
profits offshore because they become subject to tax on
repatriation back to the United States. Most deferred
profits are earned in low-tax jurisdictions, so the
foreign tax credit does not shield repatriations from
U.S. tax. The resulting deferral of U.S. tax is equivalent
to a significant reduction in the effective U.S. tax rate
on foreign-source income, and results in a very low
overall effective rate on that income because it can
frequently be earned free of foreign tax.2 
The Kerry proposal would limit deferral by subject-
ing subsidiaries of U.S. multinationals to current U.S.
tax on income earned from foreign operations aimed
at the U.S. market and markets other than the one in
which the CFC is organized. That would eliminate the
incentive to move operations offshore to the extent they
produce goods or services aimed at the U.S. market
and other export markets. U.S. multinationals would
continue to enjoy the exemption from current U.S. tax
on foreign operations aimed at foreign markets in
which they are organized to preserve their competitive-
ness vis-à-vis foreign multinationals. The revenue
raised by this proposal would be spent on reducing the
overall corporate tax rate.
In addition, the Kerry proposal would eliminate the
current incentive to leave profits abroad by offering a
Reuven Avi-Yonah is the Irwin I. Cohn Profes-
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1Code sections 951-960 (subpart F).
2Currently, almost 50 percent of the total overseas income
of our multinationals is “earned” in low-tax jurisdictions
overseas. See Martin Sullivan, “U.S. Multinationals Move
More Profits to Tax Havens,” Tax Notes, Feb. 9, 2004, p. 690.
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one-t ime opportunity to U.S.  multinationals to
repatriate income accumulated overseas at a low 10
percent tax rate. That is expected to result in significant
repatriations, and the revenue gained would be used
to offer all U.S. employers a tax credit for creating new
domestic jobs. After this temporary opportunity ex-
pires, repatriations would not result in added U.S. tax
to the extent paid out of profits subject to current U.S.
tax because of the limitations on deferral outlined
above.3
II. Kerry Proposal’s Long-Term Advantages
The Kerry proposal has obvious advantages regard-
ing short-term job creation. It eliminates the current tax
incentive for U.S. multinationals to move operations
aimed at the U.S. market overseas. It also creates an
incentive for U.S. multinationals to repatriate profits
that are currently “trapped” overseas by the tax on
repatriations, and to invest those funds in creating new
U.S. jobs to benefit from the jobs tax credit.4 Finally,
the reduction in overall corporate tax rates should also
help in stimulating new job creation.5
But the biggest advantages of the Kerry plan are its
long-term effects. First, it helps economic efficiency
and growth by reducing the current tax incentive to
invest in lower-yielding foreign operations rather than
in U.S. activities with a higher before-tax yield. Second,
it helps tax fairness by putting U.S. multinationals that
sell into the U.S. market on the same level playing field
as small, purely domestic businesses that are subject to
U.S. tax on all their income. Third, it helps simplify the
tax code by eliminating the incentive for U.S. multi-
nationals to artificially move profits from U.S. opera-
tions offshore.
The efficiency argument, or the Kerry proposal, is
based on capital export neutrality (CEN), which most
economists would agree is still the best goal of U.S.
international tax policy.6 CEN is based on the notion
that overall welfare is increased if investors are free to
make choices without regard to taxes. Thus, absent
taxes, a U.S. investor should prefer a U.S. investment
yielding 10 to a foreign investment yielding 7. Deferral,
however, results in the U.S. investment being subject
to current tax while the foreign investment is not taxed
by the U.S. Thus, after taxes the investor would prefer
the foreign investment (yielding 7) to the U.S. invest-
ment (yielding 6.5 after a 35 percent tax), resulting in
welfare loss.
The fairness argument for the Kerry proposal is that
it puts U.S. multinationals selling into the U.S. market
on the same level playing field as purely domestic U.S.
businesses subject to full U.S. tax. Under current law,
tax on the income from those sales by the U.S. multi-
national can be deferred, resulting in a competitive
advantage to the U.S. multinational over the small U.S.
business. In addition, the Kerry proposal is in effect a
tax increase on large U.S. multinationals to finance a
tax cut for all U.S. corporations.
Finally, the simplification argument for the Kerry
proposal results from its limitations on deferral. Given
deferral, U.S. multinationals have an incentive to ar-
tificially shift profits offshore through transfer pricing.
The IRS spends significant resources on combating
those schemes. In fact, most transfer pricing cases
litigated since 1980 involve U.S. multinationals rather
than foreign multinationals. To the extent deferral is
abolished, the U.S. multinationals will have no further
incentive to adopt aggressive transfer pricing policies
with their foreign subsidiaries on income earned from
sales into the U.S. or other export markets (because the
income will be subject to U.S. tax whether earned by
the parent or by the subsidiary).
III. Some Objections
A. It’s Better to Abolish Deferral Altogether
The most cogent objection to the Kerry proposal is
that it goes only halfway: Deferral is abolished only to
the extent U.S. multinationals sell into the U.S. market
or other export markets. It is certainly true that abol-
ishing deferral altogether would enhance both the ef-
ficiency and simplification advantages of the proposal.
But that runs into the political reality that abolishing
deferral altogether is not a plausible outcome because
it arguably puts U.S. multinationals at a competitive
disadvantage vis-à-vis foreign multinationals in selling
to foreign markets. While that argument may be over-
stated (because, for example, our trading partners in
fact have antideferral rules that are quite similar to
subpart F), it sells.7
The Kerry proposal is an ingenious way to draw the
line between deferral and current taxation, where it
makes most sense from a competitiveness point of
view. To the extent U.S. and foreign multinationals sell
into the U.S. market, we can make sure both are fully
3It could be argued that this temporary amnesty penalizes
multinationals that have repatriated at a higher tax cost, but
this is a small group.
4This problem is currently more acute because of the
added pressure on U.S. multinationals to distribute divi-
dends as a result of the 2003 tax cuts.
5Economists generally agree that tax rate cuts result in
economic growth to the extent they are not debt-financed. This
distinguishes the proposed Kerry corporate tax cut, which is
paid for, from the irresponsible tax cuts of the Bush admin-
istration.
6CEN is superior to its rival capital import neutrality
(CIN) as long as the elasticity of the demand for capital
(investment location) is higher than the elasticity of the supply
of capital (savings rate) in response to tax differentials, which
most economists would agree is the case. See U.S. Treasury,
Subpart F: A Reconsideration (2000); Harry Grubert and John
Mutti, “Do Taxes Influence Where U.S. Corporations In-
vest?,” 53 Nat’l Tax J. 1 (2002).
7While none of our trading partners have abolished defer-
ral altogether, several eliminate it on all foreign income sub-
ject to a low effective foreign tax rate, which amounts to the
same result because deferral is meaningless for income sub-
ject to high taxes at source. Moreover, if we abolished defer-
ral, it is likely that our trading partners would follow suit
(just as they adopted CFC rules in response to the enactment
of subpart F). See Avi-Yonah, “Tax Competition and Multi-
national Competitiveness; The New Balance of Subpart F,”
Tax Notes International, Apr. 19, 1999, p. 1575.
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taxed.8 To the extent the foreign multinationals sell to
foreign markets in which they are organized, they may
be exempt, and therefore U.S. multinationals should
enjoy deferral for those sales.9 Neither the current line
drawn by subpart F (largely between active and pas-
sive income) nor other proposed lines (for example,
between income subject to high and low foreign tax)
achieve that goal in the same way, and that is the most
ingenious and significant innovation in the Kerry pro-
posal.
B. Administrability Issues
Drawing any line in tax law raises administrability
issues, and for the Kerry proposal the issue is how to
distinguish between income from sales into the U.S.
(and other export sales) and income from overseas
sales in the jurisdiction in which the CFC is organized.
To do that, subpart F must segregate those two pools
of gross income and then apportion deductions be-
tween them. That is hard, but not harder than segregat-
ing subpart F income from other income under current
law.
C. Inversions and M&A
The most common objection to the Kerry proposal
is that it will encourage inversions — moving the
parent corporation of a U.S. multinational offshore to
avoid the new expanded subpart F regime. That may
be true, but it can be addressed by combating inver-
sions. There are proposals pending in Congress to do
that, but my favorite remains to redefine U.S. corporate
residence to include a U.K.-style managed and con-
trolled test. That would take care of the problem unless
management is actually willing to move to Bermuda.10
Similarly, the threat of 50/50 joint ventures with
foreign partners can be addressed by lowering the
threshold of what it takes to be a CFC (the French, for
example, just require 10 percent ownership, not con-
trol).
Another argument traditionally made against ex-
panding subpart F is that it will encourage foreign
takeovers of U.S. multinationals.11 That assumes that
the antideferral rules of our trading partners are more
lax, which I would dispute. But even if that were true,
the Kerry proposal would not encourage takeovers
since both foreign and U.S. multinationals will be
treated the same: Taxed in full if selling into the U.S.,
exempt from current tax if selling overseas in the juris-
diction they are organized in.
IV. Conclusion
In 1961 President Kennedy proposed to tax U.S.
multinationals on all income earned by their foreign
subsidiaries, while reducing overall corporate tax
rates. The Kerry proposal is a worthy descendant of
that tradition, updated to suit current market condi-
tions. It would reverse a decade-long erosion of subpart
F, which has been steadily contracted by Republican-
dominated congresses since 1994. Implementing that
proposal would both help job creation in the short run,
and improve the overall efficiency, fairness, and
simplicity of U.S. tax law in the longer run.
8This assumes that foreign multinationals can be taxed on
income from U.S. sales deriving from both production and
distribution activities. I believe that is possible; see the pro-
posal developed in Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, “Globalization, Tax
Competition and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State,” 103
Harv. L. Rev. 1573 (2000).
9They may also be exempt when selling to other foreign
markets, but since there is no clear nontax reason not to
organize a subsidiary in the market you sell into, it seems
appropriate not to extend deferral to those cases. See the base
company rules.
10See Avi-Yonah, “For Haven’s Sake: Reflections on Inver-
sion Transactions,” Tax Notes, June 17, 2002, p. 1793.
11The example usually given of tax-driven M&A is Daim-
ler/Chrysler, but this is a canard since German section 367-
type rules made it impossible for Chrysler to take over
Daimler (and see also Juergen Schremp’s testimony in the
Kerkorian litigation that he always viewed this as a Daimler
takeover of Chrysler, so that a structure in which Chrysler
remained on top was never seriously considered).
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